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The  Commission presents to the Council: 
A report  on the tariff negotiations which it conducted 
under Article XXIV( 6)  of the General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Tra.de  (GATT)  •••••••••••••·~·••••••••••••··••••·••·o· ·SECTION  I 
A draft decision approving Schedule LXXII  (European . 
Economic  Community)  containing the concessions 
resulting froni  the conclusion of the negotiations 
'  . 
under Article XXIV(6)  of the GATT  •o••••o••••••••••••••o•••••••  SECTION  II 
.  .  - . 
A  draft decision by the Representatives of the 
Governments of ithe Member  States of the European ·coal  · 
and Steel Community meeting within the Council 
approving s·chedule LXXII:.Eis  (~emb~r St.a.tes. of  th~ ECSC) 
containing the concessions resulting fro·m  the 
. conclusion of the negotiations under Article xxrv(6) 
of the GATT  ••  • ~ ~ •••• • •• • ~ •.•• •.  • •••• •. • o ••  • .• o.  ·• •• .-,,. •.  • ••••.• .:  •  o  ·  SECTiqN  III 
*  *  ..:.·  * 
In view of the results obtained,  the Cominission  considers that it is in the 
interests of the Community  to  conclude these negotiations.  The  Council is 
invited to  act  by  31  July 1974,  when the obligations resulting from the new 
... lists of tariff concessions  a.re  to  come  into effect• 
:.·. 
·.· .. 
.  ~-:  .  : . 
.  ~~·  ... 
·,::. 
A. 
I.  REPORT  ON  THE  NEGOTIATIONS 
Introduction and  general  remarks  on  the particular difficulties · 
of the negotiations 
1.  During its session of 18-19  December  1972 the Council  authorized the · 
Commission,  in·accordance with Article 113  of the Treaty,  to conduct 
negotiations under Article:XXIV(6)  of the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and. 
Trade  (GATT)  with  a  view td  withdrawi~g the concessions relating to the  . 
various  customs territories:  making up the enlarged Community  and  to 
replacing them  b,y  a  new  schedule of  concessions relating to the Community 
as  a  whole  (I/198/72 - COMER  103). 
2.  As  might well  have beeri  expected,  these were difficult and delicate 
negotiations.  Experience has  shown  that such negotiations are  alw~s 
very onerous for the develop.ed  countries which have to participate,  in that 
only the country modifying  its·~~~und customs duties is. called upon  to make 
concessions;  as  a·conclusionmust  be reached,  the partner':'  are well-
placed to bring pressure to bear in order to satisfy their dema.rids  to the 
maximum. 
3.  The  psychological  climate surrounding the negotiations was  hardly  a 
favourable one.  When  a  GATT  working party examined  the Accession 
instrumen;ts in 1972,  many  countries  expressed serious misgivings  as to the 
effects of the enlargement  on their trade.  · Their fears were  intensified 
b.y  the fact that the enlarged Community  is itself party to a  network of 
arrangements  involving either customs  unions or free-trade  areas.  A 
·.strong difference of opinion arose within the working party over the methods 
to be used for comparing the incidence of the customs duties and other 
·.  regulations of coinmerce  of the enlarged CommUnity .to  such inoidence under 
the Community _of  the Six plus ·the acceding countries. (in acc:ordance with 
Articie XXIV(5)(a).  This difference of opinion,  which  led the working 
. · -. 
...  ·  . ·, . 
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party to  suspend the comparative examination pending the results of. the 
negotiations \Ulder  Article XXIV( 6),  etr.engthened certain countries' · 
determination to obtain from  the negotiations concrete results in the 
form  of a  significant reduction. in the Community  customs tariff. 
4.  The  principal difficulty facing the Commlmity  was  its partners' 
tendency to try to make  the negotiations ·do  more  than simply maintain 
concessions at as favourable  a  level  as  before  enlargement  as required 
·by Article XXIV(6).  This,  for  example,  is why,  in their appreciation of 
·._of  th~ ·commlmity's  offer, 'the United States,  Japan,  Canada  and  other 
countries took into consideration the inc'idence on their export's of the 
preferential effect created by removing  customs duties not  only between-
the constituent territories of the  enlar~ed Community,  but between the 
. _enlarged Community  and  the many  third co\Ultries with which it is linked.· 
· fhe Commission  rejected this idea as being incompatible with the 
principle which  appears in Article :XXIV(4)  of the General  Agreement,  which 
recognizes that it is desirable to increase freedom  of trade by the 
creation of free-trade areas or customs  unions  and  that the expansion of 
trade resulting from  the formation of a  customs  union or a  free-trade 
area is more  important  than ~  effects of deflection of trade.  But 
even if under GATT  rules third.countries have no  right to postulnte 
"preferential effect"  as  a  basis for compensation,  it is still no  less 
the case that the,y  have  a  considerable interest in obtaining from  the 
Community  a  reduction in its,  and  thus in its partners', protection. 
5·  The  problem arising from  the preferential links between the United 
Kingdom  and many  Commonwealth  (particularly developing)  countries, 
·illustrates this tendency to ,widen the scope of the negotiations.  Many 
. countries benefiting from  these preferences asked for· their loss of . 
advantages "to  be taken into consideration during the  negotiations~  . The. 
·Community,  ~or its part;  recognized  a  right to·  compensation only in the 
case of those few  bound  customs duties in the preferential part of the. 
\  .  .  . 
· list of United Kingdom  concessions  (for· Canada and Australia).  In the 
.  . 
case of the developing Commonwealth  countries,  as of the.other developing 
.;. 
·'-J  .. ·.·. 
{ 
'  '  t 
( 
I 
t 
f'  r  r 
- I 
.l 
~-
! 
l 
'  l 
[· 
l·· 
1 .. ·· 
f· 
l 
( 
l 
j· 
f 
f'. 
1  ,. 
l 
! [······ 
,  ..  .. 
[ 
t. 
f·-
f . 
.,._  ,.  r-
I 
!  ·. ~  r 
!-'.  j 
l 
l 
l 
I 
i 
I 
r· 
• 
-3- I/212/74-E 
countries ih general,  the Community's  system of  generalized preferences· 
and  the improvements to it made  it easier to bring the negotiations to  a 
.  ·  conclusion. 
6.  Mention must still be made  of certain countries'  insistence on 
obtaining concessions for specific products which had  alreadybeen the 
·subject of discussions or negotiations with the Community  well  before 
enlargement,  and  on their.  determination to use the negotiations ...  wi thou1; 
taking too much  notice of the rights and obligations implied b,y  GATT  • 
to obtain the concessions which they had failed to obtain previo,usly. 
7· •.. In the face  of. these numerous  difficulties and  sometimes  excessive 
.  ..  .  .  . -
demands for  compensation,  the Commission  att~pted to confine negotiations 
within the limits specified b,y  the General ·Agreement  and  to keep to the 
. practices  a:rid  or.~teria usually used when  negotiating compensatory  meas~es. 
.  .  . 
B.  The  negotiations themselves 
·There were three stages to the negotiations •  the tabling of a  first offer· 
.  . 
of concessions in January 1973,  a  supplementar.y offer in December  1973  and 
finally iri Mey- .1974,  a  decision on  a  final.offer followed by completion of 
the negotiations. 
(a) .  The first  st~e 
8.,  .On  2  January 1973,  the Commission  informed the Contracting Parties to 
.the General.Agreement that the Communities were willing to begin 
. negotiations. and that they were .offering to apply the  same tariff 
coricessioris in the enlarged Community  as in the original Commu.i'li ty in order 
to  compensat~ for withdrawaL of the old concessions.  When· this initial · 
position was  put :forward,  the.  C~mmuni  ties  spe~i:fied th~t  ~ti'~ie XXIV  did 
'  . 
. ·_  .-. 
· .... 
: --~ . 
.·.·  ·; :  ,· 
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·not imply any  obligation for the. enlarged Community  to grant the  same 
,· 
._  ~oncessions as the  o~iginal Community;  and that they co-nsidered such 
concessions to be of greater value than any  compensation which  any  third· 
country might  obtain uncier Article-XXIV(6). 
·  9.  Negotiations were  begun with sixteen1  Contracting Par-:ties·: 
_Argentina 
. Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
India 
Japan 
Maleysia 
New  Zealand 
Poland 
Romania 
South Africa 
· Sri Lanka 
United States 
Uruguey 
Yugoslavia · 
As  Ireland invoked Article XXXV  of GATT- (non-application of the General 
·' 
Agreement  between Contracting Parties) with  ~egard to Japan,  the Community  .. 
pointed out that the negotiations with Japan would  cover the constituent . 
territories of the enlarged  ~ustoms union but with the exception of 
Ireland,  and that the opening of negotiations with Japan would not  imply 
·that Ireland renounced Article XXXV.  The  concessions granted· by the 
Community  thus do· not  apply to imports into Ireland of products originating 
in Japan. 
Further,  the Commission did not begin negotiations with the Contracting 
Parties to which it is linked by· agreements  coming under Article XXIV  of 
GATT. 
I  However,  at the request of Israel  and Spain;  exchanges of letters 
. temporarily reserved those countries'  rights of negotiation under 
• 
Article XXIV( 6)  until such time as the current negotiations in Brussels on . 
I  . 
l  .  . 
the conclusion of bilateral agreements  between the Community  and the two  · 
1 countries were completed.  The attitude of Israel and Spain was  provoked·· 
-~ fear of being excluded if the bilateral. agreements were not  concluded. 
The  countries with .whom  negotiations t90k place account  f()r  83%  of the 
~nlarged Community's  imports· (other. than those from  cot1Jltries with which 
there are special bilateral arrangements).· 
·:·'  .  /~ 
fSeventeen if Pakistan,  whioh.did.not  come  forward until Decembel'l973 is. 
included. 
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10.  At  the opening on  15  March  1973  of the negotiations ~ whic~ as the 
•  rules specified,  took place on  a  bilateral basis  ~  the Commission  reminded 
each of its partners that-the exercise undertaken under Article XXIV(6) 
·". ·  had  an  important but limited object,  namely to transfer-_ and maintain in 
.  - .-~·-
. :  ~~. 
.  ·-.  . - ~ 
the tariff of the enlarged  customs union the general  level of tariff 
concessions previously granted in the customs  ta~riffs of the Six and of 
the three acceding countries.  The  Commission  asked its partners not to 
extend the negotiations beyond the limits stipulated b,y  GATT  rules  b,y 
. confronting the Community  with requests for larger concessions than those 
that would  be  consequent  upqn the introduction of the new  common  customs 
tariff,  as  such requests would  ilwol  ve dealing with questions whi,ch  perhaps.· 
· pertained to ·other sectors  • 
11.  Most  of the third  countrie~immediately pointed out that they did not 
consider the Community's  offer to be  adequate  compensation for the 
withdrawal  of concessions due to  enlargement.· 
· 12.  The  negotiations first dealt with the applications for recognition:of 
the legal rights of negotiation (direct beneficiary,  principal supplier, 
substantial  interest)  submitted b,y  third countries under Article XXVIII. 
Two  bones  of contention arose when  these rights - from  which,  for the third 
countries,  the right to  compensation derives - were  determined.  The 
first concerned the definition of substantial in·terest  (the Community  fixed· 
this interest at a  minimum  level  of lo%  of total  imports of the product 
in question into the Member  State which had granted the concession at 
issue).  The  second  concerned the way  of calculating the rights of third 
countries while taking into account  the rights of the Six and of the 
three acceding countries yis-&-vis  each other. 
.; . 
.  ·.··.·  . ·'c: 
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13.  ~fuen detailed figures  on  imports into the Nine were  available,  the 
Community  drew up  for each of its partners a  table which  s~t out,  on  the 
basis of the nomenclature of the Common.Customs  Tariff,  the bilateral 
.  . 
·situation of concessions which had  beeri withdrawn and  concessions offered 
b;y  way  of compensation. 
·In presenting these "balance sheets",  the Commission  explained the reasons· 
behind the Community's  adoption of a  mainly quantitative approach to its 
assessment  of the withdrawals  and offers of concessions folloWing. 
enlargement.  This  approach is,, {n fact,  current practice under the GATT, 
;.1hich  requires that  in all negotiations  any modifications of tariff 
concessions be expressed in terms  o~ customs receipts and volumes  of 
trade.  Most  of the concessions at issue were made  during the Kennedy  Round · 
and were negotiated as  an overall offer rather than between the principal 
. supplying countries with the grant of concessions to countries b;y  name. 
Each  concession was  made  to apply to all ·the countries in question whatever 
their status as suppliers.  To  back up  its argument,  the Commission 
explained that the Community  had not  adopted  a  selective ...  nor, 
consequently,  qualitative - approach in its withdrawals  and its offers; 
Quantitative assessment  was  thus particularly useful,  but did not  exclude 
considerations of a  qualitative order. 
14.  Further,  the Commission  indicated to its partners the concessions in 
the EEC's  overall offer which it was  willing to grant to··them  ·  by  name 
and  stated that it was  willing to examine  case by case  any other applications 
of this order. 
15.•  In accordance With  the .terms  of the· Community's first offer of 
2 January 1973  the Commission  also pointed out that the tariff quotas 
bound previously by the Six would  be reduced to the  extent of the shares 
taken by the three acceding countries.  This ruling was  only applied in 
hr  .  1  t  ee cases  • 
1Mechanical pulp for paper;  herrings. and salt-cod. 
.;. 
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16.  During bilateral meetings with the EEC,  most  countries expressed their 
·.  opinions on  the statistical tables.·  Many  of them  pointed out that the 
compensation. offered cannot  be assessed exclusively in statistical terms 
but  must  also be  seen from  a  qualitative angle,  to take· account  of the 
impact  of tariff modifications  on  their export possibilities.  These 
~ountries reiterated their request for additional  compensation,  in a  few 
cases for industrial products,  but mainly for a.gricul  tural products. 
(b)  First supplementary offer of concessions 
.  . 
17• ··After four months  of negotiations,  the Commission  considered,  largely.· 
in the light of information contained in the statistical tables,  that the 
first offer of 2  January 1973  was  valid as  a  whole  but  involved imbalances 
in both the agricultural and  industrial sectors for certain countries seen 
in isolation. 
In July 1973  therefore,  mindful  of Article XXVIII(2),  which  specifies that 
· concessions 'must  be maintained  at a  level not  less favourable than 
previous.ly," the Commission  considered it necessary to put further proposals 
to. the Co'llncil  improving upon  its first offer. ·  The  Council was  not  able  .·· 
to make  a  supplementary offer before early December  (Doc.  I/184/73- COMER  69)~ 
. This. offer,  however,  fell short of the  Commission'~ proposals •. 
. 18.  The  Comniission  immediately presented this supplementary offer to its · 
various partners  and  made  the point that these offers were,  in the 
.  . 
Cormnunity's  opinion,  sufficient  compensation to.warrant winding up  the 
tlegotiatio~s with all thiri countries on  all·  products~-·  The  Community  did 
not;  therefore;  consider it possible to  embark upon  a.· series of improvements . 
to .the  conce~sirins. set out in the offer. 
.;  ... 
;  ' .. 8 
..  !  •· 
19 •.  Twelve  of'  the sixteen Contracting Parties which were  asked for an. 
··  ea~ly reply gave their opinions at the end.  of March i9'74.  ··The 
following countries stated that they were willing to  conclude the 
renegOtiations  on. the fresh bases proposed by the Commission:  Sri Larika,  •·  . 
in View  of the EEC's  system of generalized preferences;  South Africa, 
. Yugoslavia and  New  Zealand providing that  certain concessions were· made 
to them by name,  which posed no problems to· the Community·.  Brazil 
and Japan did not reject the  of(:~r but  hoped to obtain certain promises· 
from  the Community  as to its future ·intentions regarding some  ot their. 
.  ·.  .export products - soluble coffee  and cocoa butter  ~Brazil) and preserved.  . 
. ·:  : t:una.-:fish  and mandarins  (Japan). 
20.  Other countries- the.United States,  Australia,  Canada,  Poland  and 
.. ·Argentina - which  thought  the improved offer ~as still inadequate as  .. 
regards quantity and quality;.  subTnitted  additional applications for  ·.  ·. 
,.•,  .  .  . 
supplementary ta:t'!if'f  concessions or other commitments  (e  .. g.,_ bacon for 
c·:' 
}' 
Poland;  cereals f'or the United. States,  Australia and  Canada;  beef'  and.  '  ,  --
veal f'or  Argentina)  ~  India confined it  seif' to. st  ati~g. that  it_  was 
··.  ··-
dissatisfied.  ·  ..  Uruguey  and  Romania did not ·formulate additional -requests 
un_til  M9ir  and  June. 
·_:  '.• 
In spite of many  urgent  r·eminders,  Chile  and Maleysi·a  reutaih-~d :sil~nt. ·  · 
. .  .  .  ~ 
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(c)  .The  second  supplementary offer of concessions 
21.  At  its meeting of 1  and  2  April  1974  the .Council  reexamined the 
state of the negotiations,  particularly in the light of  th~ additional 
requests made  by  the United States.  The  Council  invited the 
. Commission to investigate together with the United States Delegation. 
how  it l-iould  be possible::to  conclude the negotiations on  a  mutually 
·.satisfactory basis.  These results were to be  communicated to the 
' .  .  . 
-:>. 
, .. 
Permanent  Representatives  ~ornniittee,  which was  empowered  to modify the  ·:  > 
negotiating directives as  and when  necessary. 
22.  The  Commission  carried out these exploratory talks and  examined 
the state reached in the renegotiations with· the various countries 
which  had  submitted additional requests for concessions. 
23·~  Fi~ally; in order to bring the negotiations to a  close,  the 
Community  made  offers which involved additional tariff. concessions for 
_  _._ ...... 
some  of the cotintries which  had refused to  conclude,  a  formula for 
. regulating the three acceding countries'  concessions for cereals,  and 
an  answer  ~o a  request  b.y  Poland for bacon  and by Brazil for  cocoa 
. butter and  soluble coffee1•  The  Community  also specified that all the 
tariff reductions  and  corresponding adjustments in the  aligh,ment  of the  .. 
three acceding count:Hes would take effect on 1  January 1975,  subject to 
a.nY  ·indications to the contrary in the schedule of tariff concessions,· 
and  announced that the schedule of concessions of the EEC  (Six)  and of 
the three acceding countries would  be replaced on  31  July 1974  b,y  the. new 
schedule of concessions on the  common  customs tariff of the  enlarged. 
:  -~·  .. 
Community.  As  from  that date the Community  would  consider  it~elf bound  .. ·.,. 
b.y  the fresh obligations on its common  customs tariff involved by the 
new  schedule. 
24..  At  time of writing,  the winding up of. t.P.e. "biiateral negotiations . 
(initialling procedures) with each of the partners was  in process  • 
1
The  solution involves the  two  countries in question in sending a.  letter to 
. the Community,  which must formally acknowledge receipt thereof. · 
. ;-..  ' . 
,·-,· 
.. 
·f !' 
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._  . 25.  Of course,. until  conclusi~n 'Py  the Council,  the  Co~ty  IDB\Y'  ·review 
its ·concessions and,  if necessary,  withdraw those  which apply to a.cy  country, 
refusing to conclude.  As  these would be  withdrawals for all countries, 
the  Community  should ensure that concessions granted to each of the other 
· ·countries are maintained at no less favourable  a  level than before  any 
such withdrawals. 
26.  Once  the Council has  concluded the results of the negotiations,  the 
Community will set in motion the  GATT  "certification"1  procedure ,applicabte 
· ..  ' in cases of modification of concessions resulting from negotiations under 
Article XXviii  (referred to in Article XXIV(6).  According to this 
procedure  the codified schedules of concessions2 of the EEC  and ECSC  are-.. 
considered to be certified if.'no contracting-party ha.S  rai~ed.s:rzy- objection 
within_the  sixty d~s following distribution of suoh schedules  •  .. 
1  See  GATT  decision ·of.19 November  1968  (BISD Supplement  No  15,  P•  69)• 
.  .  '  . 
. 2In· the case -of  certificati~n, the  schedules of concessions do not  indicate 
the coUntries which are the beneficiaries b,y  name  of the concessions. 
.  .  ' .  '  . : 
.. '-.:> 
.r  -· 
. i  - _,_ 
!./: '• 
- ;·· 
r.:· 
~  -...  ' 
'•. 
1(,  . 
·  ... 
'  [; 
.·  . 
. ·. i' j.· 
i'  i  .. 
i 
·• 
.• 
- 11  - I/212/74-E · 
c.  Results 
27.  For each of the partners,  the statistical tables giving figures  for 
withdrawals of concessions and  offers of compensation are  in terms  of 
·-.: 
.  .  .  .  -~·  .. 
.  .  '· 
customs receipts and  volumes  of trade,  the traditional-criteria for 
_  GATT  negotiations.  Increase· or decrease  of customs receipts has  been 
calculated by  comparing receipts obtained under the  old concession 
·  arrangements  of the  Communi-ty  of the Six and  of the  three  acceding countries 
with those resulting from  the offers of concessions  by  the enlarged . 
CommUnity.  Volumes  of trade were  calculated for tariff headings which 
were  the subject of concessions in the tariff of one  or more  acceding 
·  •  countries and which are not bound  in the  customs tariff of the enlarged 
;·  ..... 
. - ''  .,. 
;  .  ) 
·· .... 
'  ' 
EEC  (volumes of trade unbouild.),  and  vice versa  (volumes  of trade recently 
bound). 
28.  In these tables, all concessions have  been included regardless of the· 
supplier status of the country in question to take  irito account  the fact  ·  ·.· 
· that most of the concessions at issue in the negotiations were  granted during the·· . 
Kennedy  Round,  that is without  indication of the  country which is the direc-t; 
.beneficiary and  which  thus has certain special rights of compensation._·  This 
method  of presentation made  it possible to give  the  proposed concessions  ·  .. 
maximum  application. 
29.  In quantitative terms,  according to the  parameters  of customs  receipt~ arid·  .  · 
volumes  of trade,  the final results of the negotiations are as  follows:· 
i. Customs  receipts  :  a  balance of ~  45  million for the partners of the 
Community.  This is due  to a  credit in the industrial sector,  of which 
part went  to compensate  the agricultural debit• It should be  pointed 
out that a  large part of the credit in the  ind~strial sector goes to 
the United States since;  because  of its very diversified range  of 
exports,  that  country has  reaped  the  full benefit of all tariff 
·.,  ... · 
·,  . 
·,  .... 
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reductions that have  been  made~  The  initial offer vis-a-vis the United 
.. States showed a credit of ~22 million in customs receipts.  There  are other 
count~ies which have .:haa.  the benefit of this credit:  ca.n.ada  ,t6.5 million,-.·. 
.  ·Japan  ,t2.8 million, India·· ,t1.4 :~illio~,  Brazil ¢1.2 million,  etc..  This 
means  that for  some  of these countries the initial debit has either been 
,converted· to credit· or has at least been reduced  • ·  However,  customs 
·receipts for  some  countries (e.g. Australia,  Argentina and  New  Zealand).  . 
stii~.--s~?.~E:!d a  slight debit  eveii· al'ter·the offer·waa improved but .for most' 
_:_~of  them. the volumes  of trade  showed a  credit balance. 
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,. :ti. Volumes  of trade  bound  and  unbound:  Overall,  the concessions  grapted by 
'- ..  · 
the .Community  are tr.anslated in the tariffs of the three acceding countries  .  .  .  . . 
by· further binding of duties worth ¢1600 million and unbinding worth ¢850 million.· 
. ·. 
in volume  of·trade•  The  principal products. to be  bound for the first time 
.  . 
are tea,  tobacco,  copper,  wool  and mutton.  Those  products to be unbound  · ; 
are cereals,  lard,  butter,· preserved pigmeat,- leathers,  hides and skins,. wood, .• 
etc. 
30.  Quantitative considerations apart,  the Commission gave  ita partners to 
UI?derata.rid  that,  seen from the  qua.li  tati  ve angle, ·the offers of compensation.· . 
were  fUl~ satisfactory•  Tariff reductions due  to enlargement  were  made 
mainlj in industry,  where  the United Kingdom's  customs tarif:fwas on  average 
(  .·  .  .  .  .  . 
1.5-to 2  points higher than_ the EEC•s.  Trade  in this sector tends to be 
particularly dynamic  and is relatively sensitive to modifications in customs· 
duty.  In agriculture,  however,  frontie·r measures are not generally very.··  .  :  . 
indicative of thereal degree of  supp~rt provided.  The  Commission also 
pointed-out that over the last ten years agricultural  imports  into the Six 
rose.far faster than into the three acceding. countries·- particularly the 
United Kingdcim- arid  that,  consetzuent~, the  Community's  offer in this sector 
should be .assessed  qualitatively~ as a function of this moredynamic  evolution 
-.·. 
.  .  ~.  . . 
_:  _:  .':.-: 
.-.-
··,,.' 
;--
..-·  '  .  '·. 
;' 
t 
t.:.  . .  ~- <;  ...  +~··,· 
..  •!'  .  ·.  •' 
L· 
:·· 
'  ' 
·'[:  ' 
;. 
·I·  r. 
.  .  I. 
t 
l 
F •. 
~t '' . 
.·:-- 13 -·  I/212/74-E  .  .  . .  . . 
.. of trade. 
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.) 31.  The  withdrawal  of the three acceding countries'  concessions for cereals · 
was  one  of the crucial points of the negotiations.  The  United  Stat~s, 
Canada,  and Australia,  which were  the countries mainly concerned,  stated 
that they considered it to be  of the utmost  importance,  to maintain their· 
rights to compensation in this sector,  given the concessions they had 
obtained  from  the  acceding States concerned.  The  Community  did not 
consider itself able  to make  ,any  commitments  in this sector and did its 
best to  show  that the  offers for other products fully compensated  the 
withdrawal of all the  concessions  including those  for cereals. 
The  solution which was  ultimatel.S·:retained  involved  a  formal  record of disagreemen1,;. 
The  United States considers,. for its part,  that the negotiations on these  product_s 
are not yet at an end  and  reserves the right to continue  them  and,  if they prove  •·  .  ·. 
unsuccessful,  to withdraw concessions which are substantially equivalent;  whereas 
~he Community  considers the negotiations  on all products with all countries to be 
at an end.  If one  or more  countries should withdraw concessions,  the  Commu.tp.ty 
reserves .the right to make  counterwithdrawals itself so that the  balance of 
concessions  is reestablished1• 
In spite of this difference of opinion and  in view of the complexity of .the 
i.· 
·.  •.· 
.  1 
:,. 
·I 
'!"  .. · 
'  .  .  ·,. 
! . 
cereal problem,  the United States and  the  Communi ties have  agreed to hold further·· 
discussions with a  view to seeking suitable solutions to.  the_problems 'of international  i 
.• I. 
i· 
trade through international negotiationS. 
This  proposal was  commUnicated  toCa.riada and Australia but no  answer had  b~en 
:r-eceived  at time  of writing. 
1  .. 
A note  to -this effect was· inserted in the codified schedule of c0nceeisions  •• 
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. D.  Conclusions 
.  .  . 
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32~  There ·are  a  co:risiderable  amount  at. stake during the· negotiations under 
....  :: 
. 
'  .  ...  . 
i  . 
·..  ......- ~  : 
.....  . .  '  ~-- '· 
Article XXIV( 6).  The  enlargement of the  CommUnity  hacf to be. presented to 
._  :·; 
·,  •  ...  I' 
.. 
the  GATT  to have it, a.s  it were,  accepted and recognized by the  GATT •. 
Gj.veri  the difference at the  begi~ing of the  riegoti~tions between the 
. .  .  .  . . 
position of. the  Coiililllini ty  ·- founded  on rights and obligations in accordance . 
with GATT  rules  ~ and the position of the ma;ey_ third countries who  wished 
to use  the negotiations to obtain a  unilateral lowering of the EElc'.  customs 
..  tariff, the .Commission considers that the results are  sa.tiefa.ctocy_. · 
. ·  . - -.  .  .  . 
Conclus~on by the_ CounciL on the  proposed 'bases  ~ill- allow the CommUnity  tC?  ·.  ·. 
tSke  part in the multilateral  trad~ ·negotiations .  on the . basis . or' ·a cUstoms 
.  . 
tariff recognized by its partners in the GATT. 
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SECTION II 
Draft 
. '  -.-:  : _.  ~  .'  ·- ;  .  ..  . 
..  COUNCIL  DECISION·. 
-. ·_;.- ~  .. :  ......... ,.. .  ·-·  ··:-~··; -·- ..........  .  .. ...... ~---·-·  .. : 
:. __ . : .. 
'THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITII!S, 
l  '  •  .  •  •  '  .. ·.;:: . 
.(:· 
....  .-·  ··,.·· 
· ..  ·.  ·.;  ,·. :  . 
~ .. .  ':. : 
--..  -~  ., .. 
.·  ... · 
,.· .. 
.  ··  ·  ·Ha:~ing reiard. to the Treaty  est~blishing the European Economic  Community,  and 
..  ·  - .  .  .  .  .  . 
'·,;  ·in particular Article 113  th~reo:f;  .....  i 
- .  .  .  !i 
_Having regard to -!;he. report of the  Commission on. the results. of the -tariff .remegotia~~- [{:: 
··  . .  ions under .Article: x:lav(6) .of the  General Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade  which~: it· :::  .  t·;. 
.· .. · 
conducted on behalf of the  c~miDuni~ies with the Ooritracti.ng Parties to that  ··  ·  ·  .:  .r;·. 
; '. i''·  .. ·:·- >  :- ... ·  ·:  r."  ... ; 
.  :  '  .. ·  .  .  .  ~  . .  .  :  '- r- :;-:, 
'';  :.·  .  :::  t  ~.< 
. Agreement;  ... :· 
.  . .  . . 
· ..  Whereas the  results of these renegotiations are  sati_sfactory;  . . .  !:.:  ...  ·.:-.·::_1< 
. .  HAS  DECIDED:  .  .  .  <  ';,f· . 
. '·. .  ;·  . :..  :. ; ~ .  .  . :  :  [:_:·. 
;_:·~ 
. .  ;_,:  Artiole  1  ·· ..  ; 
....  ,,  •·.  ··  ... : .::·. ··.·t 
:  .  .  •  .  .:  ~ 
·.: ........  [•;.' 
;-: .  -
···Schedule  LXXII  6f the European Conuriunities  containing the. concessions resulting 
. :  . ·  ~from the renegotiations under Article XXIV(6)  of the  GATT  is hereby approved  on . · 
,·.  . 
.behalf of the  Community.  ·  ..  This  schedule,  reproduced in the  annex hereto, · · . 
indicates the Contracting Parties to which concessions S;re  accorded by name. 
As  from 31  July 1974 it replaces the  following schedules:  XL  (European Economic  . 
.l  .  .  .  .  .  .  ···. 
·.  Cozmnuni ty),  XIX,  Section A,  Parts I  and II (United 'Kingdom•  Metropolitan Territory),  : · · :f 
\XII  (Denmark),  and  LXI,  Parts  j::"'·  and II (Ireland),  annexed to the  GeneZt.al  Agreement•  •  ·  f 
Article.2 
·:The  President of the  Counc:il is hereby authorized to designate the person empowered .. · 
;;.to curiderta.ke. the formalities of. conclusion and to confer  on him the  powers  requi~ed 
.  f' 
. . 'to birid the  Community~ 
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Annex  to SECTION  II 
'  . 
Draft ScheduiEi  LXXII  (EUropean  Eoonomic(Gommuniiiy) 
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SECTION  III 
. ....  ·,  . 
Draft 
DECISION 
THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS  OF  THE  MEMBER  STATE:>  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  COAL  AND  STEEL  COliJlviDNITY  MEETING  WITHIN  THE .COUNCIL, 
Having regard to the report  from  the  Commission on the results of the · 
.  .  . 
tariff renegotiations under Article XXIV( 6) of the  General Agreement 
on Tariffs and  Trade  which it conducted  on behalf of the  Community  with 
· the Contracting Parties to that Agreement; 
Whereas the results of these renegotiatione·are satisfactory; 
HAVE  DECIDED: 
·Article  1 
Schedule  LXXIIbie(.Member  States of the ECSC)  containing the concessions 
resulting from_ the renegotiations under Article XXIV(6)  of the  GATT  is-hereby 
approved  on behalf of the Member  States of the European Coal  and  Steel 
Community.  .  This  schedule,  reproduced in the anne:Xhereto,  indicates the 
Contracting Parties to which concessions are accorded by  nallle..  As  from 
31  July 197  4  it replaces Schedule XLb:U:.{Member  States of the ECSC)  annexed to 
the General Agreement. 
·Article· 2 
The  President  of the  Council  is hereby  a11thor.ized  to designate the person 
empowered  to undertake  the formalities of conclusion and  to oon£er  on him 
the  powers required to bind the Member  States o.f  the  Community. 
!.'·'·. - ·18  ;..  I/212/74-E 
Arinex  to SECTION III 
.  Draft List.LXXIIms(Member  States of the ECSC) 
·' 
The  text of this Annex :.will 'be. distributed separately. 
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